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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

WORKING GROUP

Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting
1030 Hours, 12 March 1975
White House Situation Room

NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Chairman: Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC

Members present: Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Dept. of State
(representing Mr. George S. Vest,
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs)
Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs)
Mr. William N. Morell, Special
Assistant to the Secretary on National
Security, Department of the Treasury
RAdm Robert P. Hilton (representing
Lt Gen John H. Elder, J-5 (Plans and
Policy), JCS)
Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Executive
Secretary of the NSCIC

Briefers: Maj General Lincoln D. Faurer

Others Present: Lt General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., Intel Panel
Mr. Paul Walsh (for Dr. Proctor), Intel Panel
[redacted] (for Mr. Carver), Intel Panel
VADM Earl F. Rectanus, with Mr. Ellsworth
RADM Donald Harvey, with RADM Hilton
Captain Gerald N. Dyer, with RADM Hilton
[redacted] with Lt Gen Wilson
[redacted] with Lt Gen Wilson

Agenda Item 1: Approval of the Minutes of the 29 January Meeting

1. The draft minutes were approved subject to changes Mr. Ober proposed in paragraphs 27, 29, 31, and 33. Revised pages 6 and 7 of the 29 January meeting are being provided each member.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
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Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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Agenda Item 2: Improvements in the Handling of Warning Information

25X1A 2. General Faurer's paper on "Changes in the Strategic Warning Mechanism" and [] paper on "Small-w Warning" had been distributed previously.

3. General Faurer reported his Strategic Warning Staff of 10 analysts was still being assembled. The CIA, DIA, Army, and Air Force analysts are on duty; and the NSA, State and Navy analysts are expected shortly.

4. It is planned a report will be issued the last Tuesday of each month as a synthesis of warning indications. General Faurer said contributions were welcome and informal coordination should surface any differences in interpretation, but he wanted to avoid having to present the least common denominator in order to effect coordination.

5. During the month as subjects suggest themselves the Warning Staff will prepare special reports if it appears the Staff can make a contribution beyond that of the individual current intelligence agencies. In a typical month, General Faurer expected "only a handful" of such reports to be disseminated. His Staff will also issue research reports not substantive in nature, but dealing with the methodology of warning. He also will issue Strategic Warning Notices, purpose of which is self-explanatory, focus of which will be on the "Big-W" problem, but his Staff will be alert for any Soviet or PRC activities relating to "little-w" warning.

6. Mr. Ellsworth said he hoped the system for providing warning to users would err on the side of fast reaction and under coordination. He also hoped there would be a system for follow-up to Alert Memoranda and regular reporting on development related to the alert.

7. General Faurer agreed. He said the Alert Memorandum goes beyond the "Big-W" problem. It is his intention to recognize a warning need to follow-up, to monitor the situation, and to turn the reporting off as appropriate. He said that within DIA "little-w" problems would be handled the same way.

25X1A 8. [] said an Alert Memorandum must be issued quickly when, for instance, the development is 15 percent likely rather than 50 percent. He noted that once the Alert Memorandum is issued, regular current intelligence reporting will provide a follow-on. He felt any "De-alert Memorandum" would be beyond the fact.

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9. Mr. Ellsworth said the consumer might not be aware the problem situation was over, and he would still like to know when this had occurred.

10. Mr. Walsh said the reporting probably would indicate when the crisis was over, but if a special collection effort had been mounted, there would be an obligation to turn off this effort.

11. General Wilson said that careful consideration must be given to situations in which "pulling down the flag" would be useful, and it probably would be better to err on the side of issuing such a report.

25X1A 12. [] thought a summary Alert Memorandum would be most likely when the crisis situation changed direction or intensified rather than abated.

13. General Wilson emphasized that the present arrangement for the handling of warning was not easily arrived at. He noted there had been some sensitivity on the part of civilian elements of the Intelligence Community to having the Strategic Warning Staff in the NMIC alongside the NNCC. The advantage was that this put the Staff at the hub of indications activities and, in the event the situation escalated to use of U.S. forces, next to those who would act. The disadvantage was that political and economic aspects would be particularly important in some situations. It was to ensure that the Strategic Warning Staff was properly balanced that provision was made for providing civilian analysts to augment the NMIC Staff. He felt that if State, CIA and NSA provided the proper kind of analysts, there need be no concern about the handling of political and economic indicators. General Wilson said that when time is of the essence, General Faurer may issue strategic warning notices directly to the President and the NSC, with concurrent dissemination of the DCI and USIB Principals, but that normally the strategic warning notices are to go to the DCI, who will notify the President and NSC and take such other action as he deems necessary.

14. Mr. Morell asked if the group would look at the time involved in production as well as the time involved in field reporting and in dissemination. He said he had noted delays in field reporting, and in Washington needed data may not reach the analysts quickly. He felt the Working Group should pay attention to this. General Wilson suggested discussion of this matter be deferred until consideration of the Group's working program.

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15. [] said the "Small-w" warning problem and function involves the entire Intelligence Community and timeliness of reporting is an across-the-board problem. He felt overseas reporters should be sensitive to the timeliness of the information they were dealing with.

16. Mr. Morell considered that production analysts were more aware of developing situations than field reporters and that the analysts should alert the field elements as to situations which are being closely watched in order to encourage timely responses.

17. Mr. Walsh said delay in reporting on a recent OPEC meeting was an example, but an aberration. He said that CIA alerts overseas stations when there is interest in a particular situation. There may be delays in Washington, but analysts need time to question the facts and to make the data more meaningful to users.

18. Mr. Morell said he was thinking of the flow of raw material to analysts, and Mr. Walsh said that the automatic cable dissemination systems under development would help. General Faurer said he was surprised with the frequency with which telephones are used to convey first impressions, particularly with attaches. Mr. Walsh said he felt DIA was ahead of CIA in this. Mr. Morell said Treasury finds telephone contact useful. 25X1A

20. Mr. Brown asked how "Little-w" and current intelligence connect. He noted State officials get daily briefings which cover the same material he felt Alert Memoranda might deal with. He asked if questions of timing or of the use of separate groups were involved. General Wilson said the same people may be involved, but the Alert Memorandum belongs to the NIOs and current intelligence is a responsibility of the DDI.

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4

25X1A 21. [] said the principal difference between the Alert Memorandum and normal current intelligence reporting is the matter of focus. The NIB may cover 15 or 20 situations, but the Alert Memorandum is a vehicle by which the DCI can inform senior officials of particular matters on which he considers they should focus. Mr. Morell said that at the NSCIC meeting, Dr. Kissinger had indicated he needed something like an Alert Memorandum. Mr. Walsh said the Alert Memoranda serves as a means of focusing analyst attention on warning implications. [] added it also enables a clearer accountability, and both Mr. Ober and Mr. Walsh noted that the Alert Memorandum would facilitate post-mortems on intelligence performance in crisis situation.

25X1A 22. Mr. Morell asked for more information on the [] and planned cable dissemination improvements.

25X1A 23. Mr. Walsh said the Machine Assisted Dissemination (MAD) Program enables analysts to "eyeball" computer printouts and request what they want. The Automatic Cable Dissemination system, expected to be available in about 18 months, will enable analysts to receive cables without waiting for them to be indexed, as is now the case with MAD. Another development, several years off, will provide analysts cathode ray tube (CRT) support.

24. Mr. Morell asked if this would be anything like the NSA system for electronic interrogation of files.

25X1A 25. Mr. Walsh said that such developments are technically feasible, as indicated by the NPIC files and progress being made with [], but compartmentation still poses problems.

25X1A 27. As related developments, General Wilson also briefly described the [] system, in which seven--soon to be 11--watch officers can be on-line at the same time, and the meet-me-bridge being developed for secure voice interface among intelligence analysts. [] will be an extension of this conferencing technique, so that a combination of printer and CRT can be used for analyst conferencing on text. He said these developments were intended to assist in the handling of intelligence during crisis periods and the handling of crisis situations by enabling more rapid coordination.

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Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4

Agenda Item 3: DCI Objectives for the Intelligence Community for FY-1976

28. General Wilson said the substantive Presidential intelligence objectives for FY-1976 were essentially an NIO document, with inputs from a number of sources--major among which would be the comments of the Working Group. He invited comments.

29. Mr. Ellsworth said he had a number of specific suggestions, mainly relating to more detailed guidance to meet planning needs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He submitted a set of written comments, and then noted that, in general, these comments requested that all material relating to the USSR be combined in a single objective, that specific reference be made to the need for intelligence on decision making in the Soviet Union, that weight be given to intelligence on the Middle East, that there be specific mention of Spain and Portugal, that nuclear proliferation and CW/BW be addressed, and that attention be given to Soviet knowledge of U.S. and Allied negotiating positions affecting SALT, LTBT, and MBFR.

30. General Wilson recognized the validity of these points, but wondered whether they might more properly be KIQs.

31. Mr. Ellsworth said he felt the objectives paper would be improved if it became more concrete and less vague in nature.

32. Mr. Morell said he shared the general thrust of Mr. Ellsworth's comments. On economic matters, he felt oil and the recycling issue should be addressed separately. In his view, Portugal, the Middle East, oil and recycling were all buried in Objectives 5 and 6, which he described as "catch alls." He said he would be more comfortable if submitted the economic items.

33. Mr. Brown said he had struggled with the problem of relating objectives and KIQs and that State preferred to focus on the KIQs. Enlargement of the objectives list would involve a large number of "e.g.'s." State had organizational problems in preparing its comments, but he was more concerned with packaging aspects of the objectives than with their substantive content.

34. Mr. Ober said the NSC staff did not object to the general nature of the Objectives, accepted the format, and expected to focus primarily on the KIQs. He said he would specify word changes for the Objectives.

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4

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35. Mr. Walsh said that if a general list, such as the present Objectives, was tailored to become a "want list" of everyone, it would lose its value. He preferred keeping the Objectives general, using the KIQs for matters of detail.

36. RADM Hilton questioned what was meant by "security" in Objectives 1, 3 and 5. If the word meant "military," it should be so stated. He would put all the Soviet items in one objective, and the PRC items in one. He wondered how Western Europe should be treated. Though much of the needed material comes from open sources and the countries are traditionally friendly, they could well be intelligence targets.

37. General Wilson said "security" and "defense" were synonymous, and this would be clarified. He said the comments made at the meeting would be provided the personnel who would redraft the objectives and he would ensure the Group was kept current on developments.

38. VADM Rectanus said the comments he had provided Mr. Ellsworth related primarily to re-formatting although there were several specific additions to the list.

39. RADM Hilton wondered why "strategic" was singled out in Objective 4, when what seemed to be meant was "military."

40. Mr. Ober said the NSC staff was interested in getting something on the leadership in China into the list.

41. General Wilson said he would be back in touch with the Group if any real problems arose in revision of the Objectives. Mr. Ober added that he would run the OSD comments through the NSC staff.

42. General Wilson commented that the Resource Management Objectives for FY-1976 relate to the substantive objectives, but address different problems. He noted there was close collaboration in resource matters between the DCI and the ASD(I).

43. Mr. Ellsworth suggested that the DCI task himself to survey the response of users to intelligence products, and Mr. Morell said he strongly supported this. He noted this had been discussed at the USIB, and Dr. Proctor had made the point that procedures are in use to check with consumers. RADM Hilton said he thought this would be part of the Working Group action program.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4

44. The Admiral also noted that not all of the resource management objectives related to resource management. In No. 5, he suggested that "provide" be changed to "coordinate."

45. Mr. Walsh said there was a difference between the DCI responsibility to "provide" something and his coordination role. As regards No. 5 (which relates to responding to Presidential and Congressional reviews and investigations), the DCI must be in a position to "provide" the data.

46. Mr. Brown said this raised a problem, since in his view Congressional investigators would not accept indirect Community responses.

47. Mr. Walsh (after re-reading the objective) said that "coordinate" would not bother him.

48. Mr. Morell noted that No. 3 addressed "foreign economic intelligence guidance," but did not address political or military intelligence guidance.

49. General Wilson said the specific items under Objective No. 3 were those which had "burbled" to the top. The list was not meant to be all inclusive, but to highlight undertakings on which focus would be given.

50. Copies of the FY-1975 KIQs were provided members of the Group for reference, and Mr. Ellsworth said Defense would like a month to review the FY-1976 KIQs when the draft is circulated.

Agenda Item 4: DCI Perspectives for Intelligence, 1976-1981

51. General Wilson noted that the draft before the Group included only Parts I and II of the Perspectives. Part III is still being written, and the DCI has asked that a Part IV be added to "take a 20-year bite." This poses difficult problems, but since technical systems now being evaluated will have a long life, it is important that a look be made far into the future so the Community does not acquire capabilities which will not be useful after 1981.

52. VADM Rectanus commented that 20-year forecasts are being made in other areas, without the benefit of an intelligence input.

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53. General Wilson asked whether the major areas of concern to Group members were reflected in the draft, which had been prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff and was still under review by the NIOs. The "Perspectives" is a DCI paper, but at this stage is open to change.

54. Mr. Ellsworth submitted some written comments and said he considered the draft so general it provided only broad orientation with respect to the USSR, PRC and Western Europe. He thought it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the need of intelligence on decision making in foreign governments. The paper made no mention of the need to understand the workings of foreign governments. He felt there was need for more attention in the document in areas such as the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. Also, attention should be given to important functional areas, such as nuclear proliferation and arms trade. Mr. Ellsworth also said it would be useful if the DCI would disseminate a paper indicating the review cycle and draft schedule for his planning and guidance documents.

55. Mr. Brown asked what review the Perspectives document went through. He said there was objection in State to one or another of the paragraphs. He asked whether the paper represented a distillation of Community products or was a CIA view of the world. [redacted] explained the "Perspectives" was not a direct distillation from existing estimates. It was written in the Intelligence Community Staff, coordinated with the NIOs, then submitted to USIB for coordination and, after DCI approval, submitted to the NSCIC for review.

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56. Mr. Brown said he was still in the process of obtaining responses in State, but that some of the statements send State officers "up the wall."

57. General Wilson invited submission of the State comments.

58. Mr. Walsh said that the Perspectives represent a "new art form" and the mechanics to date may have been faulty. He welcomed the idea of a considerable number of people carefully reviewing the draft.

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Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4

59. VADM Rectanus asked if it was again intended the "Perspectives" would be submitted to the NSCIC, and General Wilson affirmed this. Mr. Walsh noted, however, that by then it is too late to do much about changing the paper.

60. General Wilson admitted the Group was addressing the paper while it was still in rough form, but this was being done in the interest of obtaining substantive suggestions at a time when they could best be used.

61. RADM Hilton said that if the "Perspectives" are the DCI's views as head of the Intelligence Community, they should reflect the views of the Community. General Wilson replied that the paper is considered by the USIB, and he noted that last year the NSCIC passed the "Perspectives" to the Working Group to see if any policy issues could be identified.

62. Mr. Ober said the paper seemed overly pessimistic, and he wondered how much time was available for its review. He said that two weeks was not enough to permit full consideration in the NSC staff. He asked if informal communication with the NIOs could be used as a means of providing inputs.

25X1A 63. [] said the DCI wanted the "Perspectives" out by the end of March, but General Wilson commented that it might be possible to back this off.

64. Mr. Brown asked who was reviewing the paper other than the Working Group. Mr. Morell replied that the paper was really moving along two tracks--the Working Group and the USIB arena. He thought only one or the other should be used, but RADM Hilton commented that Mr. Morell was the only member of the Working Group who sat on the USIB. RADM Hilton felt that the fact the Group had been reconstituted as a "users group" was proof of the need for a users' input.

65. General Wilson described the "Perspectives" as the DCI's personal document, in which he expressed himself on matters with which he is concerned. The USIB principals respond on the paper to the DCI as their chairman. In addition the paper will go to the NSCIC via the Working Group. General Wilson admitted this is not "a clean and tidy process," but the Working Group had an opportunity to make the document as useful as possible.

SECRET

66. RADM Hilton noted a semantic problem in that in one place the PRC is described as the "second most important" intelligence target, and in another place Western Europe is described as "most important next to the USSR." He felt it would be useful to include something on the impact of nuclear proliferation and nuclear power. He also considered terrorism was treated as an isolated event, but that sometimes it is a multi-country coordinated threat.

67. Mr. Morell asked how much time was available to comment, and would the Group meet again to consider the paper. General Wilson said he would speak with the DCI and be back to the members by telephone.

Agenda Item 5: Report by the Chairman on a Proposed Work Program for the Group

68. Copies of General Wilson's memorandum, "Proposed Program for the Working Group," were distributed. The General said this was a preliminary thrust, aimed at pertinent and feasible selections in the context of the NSCIC charter. He described the program as consisting of action projects, informational papers and briefings.

69. He noted that action is under way in the Intelligence Community Staff to prepare all four of the information papers described in the memorandum. He said the fourth paper would be accompanied by a briefing. (These four are: "Handbook on the U.S. Intelligence Community;" "Consumer Contact Points with Production Elements of the Intelligence Community;" "The DCI's 'Family' of Intelligence Guidance Documents;" and "The Problem of Expressing Uncertainty in Intelligence Estimates.")

70. Only brief comments were made on the four proposed action projects.

a. Comments on Key Intelligence Questions for FY-1976

General Wilson said the NIOs were using the FY-1975 KIQs as the base list for FY-1976 KIQs so a review of the 1975 listing would provide a foundation for addressing the 1976 KIQs, which are expected to be available from the NIOs for review by the Group about 15 May.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4

b. Critique of Intelligence Estimates

General Wilson asked if the 15 April deadline for submission of the five requested critiques was "too tight," but no member so indicated.

(NOTE: Paragraph 6b(2) of the memorandum inadvertently omitted paragraph (c) which read as follows:

(c) The individual critiques would serve as annexes to a summary report to be prepared under auspices of the Chairman. The report and its annexes would be submitted to the NSCIC with a recommendation that it be sent to the DCI for dissemination as guidance to the appropriate production organizations of the Intelligence Community."

c. Systematic consumer evaluation of current intelligence products

Mr. Morell noted that much of what Treasury receives as intelligence products is not referenced in either the project on estimates or the one on current intelligence, and he wondered if critiques could be prepared on other products. General Wilson said he was of an open mind on this. [redacted] commented that if something is working well, there is no need to study it.

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d. Provision of consumer guidance to the Intelligence Community

General Wilson briefly described the project and asked Mr. Ober if he would be willing to chair the subcommittee which would present a proposed method of approach and study outline at the next meeting of the Group. (Mr. Ober nodded.) General Wilson said that he would be back in touch with the members on this project by telephone in order to tie it down.

RADM Hilton said he had ideas concerning this project since there were various documents used for OSD/JCS dialogue which might be useful to the Intelligence Community.

The meeting adjourned at 1217 hours.

[redacted]
Executive Secretary
NSCIC Working Group

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